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Mariners fans, and for that matter most of the baseball world, will argue that Springer’s homer was also set up by a terrible decision by Wilson. The Mariners’ manager’s choice of Bazardo to face Springer in the seventh is the most derided managerial move since Kevin Cash pulled Blake Snell in the sixth inning of Game Six of the 2020 World Series. As was the case then, though, I can defend Wilson’s decision, though I think his overall performance was poor.
When Bryan Woo allowed the first two batters to reach in the seventh, Wilson faced a tough choice. He’d looked to Woo to go around the order once, and likely hoped to get eight or even nine outs from him. Now the tying run was on second, the go-ahead run was at the plate, and he still needed eight more outs. Moreover, with the top of the order up with one out in the seventh and no double play in order, it was very likely that the top of the Jays’ order would bat again in the ninth.
Wilson’s #1 relief pitcher is Andres Muñoz, who was used almost exclusively in a one-inning role. In 64 regular-season appearances, Muñoz got three or fewer outs 63 times, and four in the other game. He’d thrown more than 28 pitches once, and then just 31. As is often the case in the playoffs, Muñoz was asked to do more, getting at least four outs three times and going two full innings in ALDS Game Two. He had still yet to throw more than 25 pitches.
Once Wilson went to Muñoz, the righty would likely be asked to finish the game, especially with the likelihood that the top of the Jays’ order would bat again. I believe that asking Muñoz to get eight outs, maybe throw 30-40 pitches with the season on the line, would be setting him up to fail. I understand the argument that a manager should use his best relief pitcher in the biggest spot: I damn near invented it. In this case, though, it would be easy to foresee a second “biggest spot” seven outs later, with an exhausted Muñoz trying to retire Springer or Vladimir Guerrero Jr., or Wilson having to turn to Bazardo or Matt Brash at that point.
Where I dissent from the crowd is in the idea that Muñoz is so superior to Bazardo as to make the choice obvious. From the ALCS preview:
Bringing in Bazardo to face the Jays’ top right-handed batters in the seventh inning is a pretty good game script for Wilson. Beating good right-handed batters in big spots has been Bazardo’s job all year, and increasingly so as the year went on. Bazardo’s average Leverage Index (aLI) jumped from 0.95 in the first half to 1.24 in the second; in mid-September, when the Mariners were making their charge to win the AL West, Bazardo made eight appearances, struck out 11 of the 31 batters he faced, and had an aLI of 1.42. This wasn’t some random; Bazardo was a key member of this bullpen. From a matchup standpoint, Bazardo (.166/.231/.261, 27% strikeout rate vs. RHB) and Muñoz (.181/.276/.233, 32%) were indistinguishable for the job at hand.
Wilson didn’t have a great choice once Woo gave up the single to IKF. He knew after Andres Gimenez bunted -- what, John Schneider was going to pass up a bunt? -- he would need eight outs, and would probably need to get Springer and maybe need to get Vladito out twice. Muñoz could reasonably get six outs, and someone else was going to need to get two, either now or in the ninth. I think choosing his righty-eater to pitch to RLRR was fine. As with saying “Blake Snell was cruising,” shouting “Muñoz is his best reliever” ignores the details and turns a complex decision into a screaming match.
Any use case for Muñoz in the seventh, if there is one, has him start the inning. That lines him up to face the bottom of the order in the seventh and the top in the eighth, and if that goes well, then you can match up in the ninth with Brash and Gabe Speier with far less chance that Springer and Guerrero will come up to bat. Wilson thought he could get Woo through the bottom of the order. Even at that, pulling Woo after his second walk, this on five pitches to Barger, would have made sense. Woo was not sharp, missing gloveside repeatedly. Having Bazardo ready for IKF gives him a better chance to succeed and makes it harder on Kiner-Falefa. The original sin was asking too much from Woo, already being used in a way that voids the warranty, when you needed nine more outs, could probably ask for six from Muñoz, and had a path to keeping the top of the Jays’ order from batting a fifth time.
From the Mariners/Tigers ALDS preview:
Wilson’s decision to use Bazardo instead of Muñoz, given the batters, given the game state, given Bazardo’s skills, is defensible and I’d argue correct. Once I widen the lens to take in a longer time frame, though, I think we saw Wilson’s lack of postseason experience blow up on him. If Wilson was willing to use Bazardo in a max-leverage spot last night, then what the hell was Bazardo doing throwing two innings of minimum-leverage relief in Game Six? What was Matt Brash doing in that game? Did Brash’s 21 pitches in a three-run game affect his availability for Game Seven? Wilson chased Game Six, and while I can’t guarantee Bazardo throws a better pitch to Springer than a sinker middle-in if he’s fully rested, or that having a rested Brash might have changed Wilson’s decision tree, I do know that using them for three innings and 36 pitches down five and three runs respectively was an error. Pregame, I focused on the Brash choice, in part because I thought Wilson would stick to Muñoz, Brash, and Bryan Woo tonight. As it turns out, he needed one more guy.
When Bryan Woo allowed the first two batters to reach in the seventh, Wilson faced a tough choice. He’d looked to Woo to go around the order once, and likely hoped to get eight or even nine outs from him. Now the tying run was on second, the go-ahead run was at the plate, and he still needed eight more outs. Moreover, with the top of the order up with one out in the seventh and no double play in order, it was very likely that the top of the Jays’ order would bat again in the ninth.
Wilson’s #1 relief pitcher is Andres Muñoz, who was used almost exclusively in a one-inning role. In 64 regular-season appearances, Muñoz got three or fewer outs 63 times, and four in the other game. He’d thrown more than 28 pitches once, and then just 31. As is often the case in the playoffs, Muñoz was asked to do more, getting at least four outs three times and going two full innings in ALDS Game Two. He had still yet to throw more than 25 pitches.
Once Wilson went to Muñoz, the righty would likely be asked to finish the game, especially with the likelihood that the top of the Jays’ order would bat again. I believe that asking Muñoz to get eight outs, maybe throw 30-40 pitches with the season on the line, would be setting him up to fail. I understand the argument that a manager should use his best relief pitcher in the biggest spot: I damn near invented it. In this case, though, it would be easy to foresee a second “biggest spot” seven outs later, with an exhausted Muñoz trying to retire Springer or Vladimir Guerrero Jr., or Wilson having to turn to Bazardo or Matt Brash at that point.
Where I dissent from the crowd is in the idea that Muñoz is so superior to Bazardo as to make the choice obvious. From the ALCS preview:
Still, Dan Wilson should be able to lean more on Andres Muñoz and Matt Brash late in games without sweating matchups, while Eduard Bazardo’s mastery over right-handed batters (.166/.231/.261) elevates his importance in this series.
Bringing in Bazardo to face the Jays’ top right-handed batters in the seventh inning is a pretty good game script for Wilson. Beating good right-handed batters in big spots has been Bazardo’s job all year, and increasingly so as the year went on. Bazardo’s average Leverage Index (aLI) jumped from 0.95 in the first half to 1.24 in the second; in mid-September, when the Mariners were making their charge to win the AL West, Bazardo made eight appearances, struck out 11 of the 31 batters he faced, and had an aLI of 1.42. This wasn’t some random; Bazardo was a key member of this bullpen. From a matchup standpoint, Bazardo (.166/.231/.261, 27% strikeout rate vs. RHB) and Muñoz (.181/.276/.233, 32%) were indistinguishable for the job at hand.
Wilson didn’t have a great choice once Woo gave up the single to IKF. He knew after Andres Gimenez bunted -- what, John Schneider was going to pass up a bunt? -- he would need eight outs, and would probably need to get Springer and maybe need to get Vladito out twice. Muñoz could reasonably get six outs, and someone else was going to need to get two, either now or in the ninth. I think choosing his righty-eater to pitch to RLRR was fine. As with saying “Blake Snell was cruising,” shouting “Muñoz is his best reliever” ignores the details and turns a complex decision into a screaming match.
Any use case for Muñoz in the seventh, if there is one, has him start the inning. That lines him up to face the bottom of the order in the seventh and the top in the eighth, and if that goes well, then you can match up in the ninth with Brash and Gabe Speier with far less chance that Springer and Guerrero will come up to bat. Wilson thought he could get Woo through the bottom of the order. Even at that, pulling Woo after his second walk, this on five pitches to Barger, would have made sense. Woo was not sharp, missing gloveside repeatedly. Having Bazardo ready for IKF gives him a better chance to succeed and makes it harder on Kiner-Falefa. The original sin was asking too much from Woo, already being used in a way that voids the warranty, when you needed nine more outs, could probably ask for six from Muñoz, and had a path to keeping the top of the Jays’ order from batting a fifth time.
From the Mariners/Tigers ALDS preview:
No manager should be setting his rotation based on home/road splits, and it does make me wonder whether we’re about to find out Dan Wilson is in over his head.
Wilson’s decision to use Bazardo instead of Muñoz, given the batters, given the game state, given Bazardo’s skills, is defensible and I’d argue correct. Once I widen the lens to take in a longer time frame, though, I think we saw Wilson’s lack of postseason experience blow up on him. If Wilson was willing to use Bazardo in a max-leverage spot last night, then what the hell was Bazardo doing throwing two innings of minimum-leverage relief in Game Six? What was Matt Brash doing in that game? Did Brash’s 21 pitches in a three-run game affect his availability for Game Seven? Wilson chased Game Six, and while I can’t guarantee Bazardo throws a better pitch to Springer than a sinker middle-in if he’s fully rested, or that having a rested Brash might have changed Wilson’s decision tree, I do know that using them for three innings and 36 pitches down five and three runs respectively was an error. Pregame, I focused on the Brash choice, in part because I thought Wilson would stick to Muñoz, Brash, and Bryan Woo tonight. As it turns out, he needed one more guy.
