Monday, December 22, 2025

From the Archives: "40 Years Ago"

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Tuesday marks the 50th anniversary of one of the most momentous days in baseball history. On December 23, 1975, MLB arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that the clause in the standard player’s contract that allowed a team to renew the agreement unilaterally applied only for one year, not in perpetuity. This opened the door for players to play out their contracts and negotiate with any team, and kicked off 50 years of unimagined prosperity for both baseball players and team owners. 

As we approach another negotiation between players and owners, at heart are the same issues that were being debated 50 years ago. How much freedom will players have to choose where they play and the amount they’ll play for, and how much freedom will team owners have to compete for those players’ services? Owners -- and most MLB commissioners -- have spent every year since that winter night in ’75 trying to stifle those freedoms, not without considerable success.

I wrote about the Seitz decision ten years ago, on its 40th anniversary, and I republish that piece today. 

--J.

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The Joe Sheehan Newsletter
Vol. 7, No. 127
December 23, 2015

Mike Leake signed with the Cardinals yesterday for $80 million over five years, with an option for 2021. On its face, it's a huge deal for a pitcher who in six seasons has never received a Cy Young vote, who has never had an ERA below 3.37 (or an ERA+ above 112), who has thrown one 200-inning season. Mike Montgomery threw as many shutouts in a week last year as Leake has in his career. In six seasons, 177 games, 1083 2/3 innings, Leake has been worth 9.1 bWAR. At his best, including in 2015, he's been a three-win pitcher. It's hard, with no context, to understand how a pitcher with Mike Leake's track record, a pitcher who the casual fan had never heard of before yesterday, a pitcher who probably spent time on the waiver wire last year in your fantasy league, is now going to make a half-million bucks a start.

The seeds for Leake's contract weren't planted when he was drafted in 2009, though, or when he first picked up a baseball as a kid in California. They were planted 40 years ago today, far away from a baseball field, far away from baseball weather. They were planted on a piece of paper that changed the baseball industry, changed the sports industry, forever. On December 23, 1975, arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that the reserve clause in the standard player's contract could not be renewed in perpetuity, but rather, for one year after the last signed deal. A player -- in this case, Dodgers pitcher Andy Messersmith -- who played through a season without signing a contract, playing on the renewed terms of his old one, would be a free agent after that season. 

Baseball's owners reacted with their usual calm and forward thinking, locking out the players after the decision. Eventually, the MLBPA negotiated the terms with which we are familiar today, that a player with at least six years of service time can play out his current contract and seek employment with any team. At the time, MLB's owners claimed that free agency would destroy the game. What they learned, what we all learned, was that forcing teams to compete for talent would enrich not just the talent, but the teams themselves beyond anyone's imagination. Mike Leake's contract is one product of the Seitz decision. Another is $75 million a year for the rights to televise Arizona Diamondbacks games. Another is the average team being worth $1.2 billion. In 1975, Bill Veeck bought the Chicago White Sox, a historic team in a big market, for $10 million; in 2012, Ron Fowler bought the San Diego Padres, a 1969 expansion team with the smallest reach in the majors, for $800 million. 

Forcing the owners to compete for talent brought baseball's business into the 20th century. An industry filled with sleepy family ownerships had to innovate, to grow, to compete not just for that talent but for revenue to pay that talent. The reserve clause was not just a barrier to the free flow of baseball talent, it was a binky for teams that were happy to throw open the doors in April, lock them up again in September, and consider that their business plan. 

Those numbers above aren't just about free agency, of course. George Steinbrenner didn't invent cable television or the societal trends that have made televised sports the mother's milk of that dying industry. He did, however, lead the race to cable by moving Yankees games from free TV to cable in the 1980s, and later, to a team-owned network in the 2000s. Bud Selig wasn't the first owner to play cities off one another in an effort to get craven politicians to hand over the public purse. He just perfected the plan as the sport's commissioner for 20 years.

When you look at the big picture, though, you have to go back to 40 years ago, to Seitz examining the standard player's contract not as a vested party, but as a lawyer. You have to respect his dispassionate judgment in the face of incredible pressure; Seitz was fired by the owners, as was their right, immediately upon issuing his ruling. You have to appreciate his fealty not to arguments about the merits of freedom or the survival of baseball, but to the letter of the contract. It's a measure of how lazy the owners were, how convinced they were of their sacred right to the work product of baseball players, that the reserve clause was worded as weakly as it was. Had they simply written the clause differently at a time when they held all the power to do so, perhaps Seitz would have had to rule in their favor. Perhaps there would have been no weak contract clause to challenge. Perhaps players would have been bound to the teams holding their contracts in perpetuity, those teams would never have been forced to compete for talent, and baseball would never have moved into the 20th, much less the 21st, century.

We'll never know, of course. What we know today is that baseball is an industry that generates $9.5 billion in revenue, with franchises worth $36 billion, with players being paid close to $4 billion. The Peter Seitz decision made baseball players wealthy, but it made baseball's owners wealthy as well.


Sunday, December 21, 2025

Newsletter Excerpt, December 21, 2025 -- "Pirates/Rays/Astros Trade"

 

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Price is the key word, though. Look around the league, and you see a #4 like Adrian Houser getting $11 million a year.  Merrill Kelly, a pretty good comp for Burrows, got $20 million a year. Michael King, a #3 with #2 upside, got a guaranteed $25 million over three years with opt outs. It’s become very clear over the last two years that the Astros are pulling back on payroll. The Kyle Tucker trade, letting Alex Bregman walk, likely letting Valdez leave...this is a team that was over the tax threshold in 2024 and 2025 and is determined to be under it in 2026. Trading two prospects, two of the best in a weak system, for a $750,000 starter fits that plan more than going into free agency for similar talent does.

The Astros missed the playoffs last year for the first time since 2016. There are wide enough error bars on Melton and Brito that you can debate the merits of this trade, but you can’t argue that it is another marker of a new, lesser era of Astros baseball.
 
 
 

Friday, December 19, 2025

Newsletter Excerpt, December 19, 2025 -- "Father Figures"

 

This is a preview of the Joe Sheehan Baseball Newsletter, an e-mail newsletter about all things baseball, featuring analysis and opinion about the game on and off the field from the perspective of the informed outsider.

You can subscribe to the newsletter for one year for $79.95 using your PayPal account or major credit card. (Zelle users, please email me for details.)

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You can’t win by trading Juan Soto, but in getting King from the Yankees in the deal, the Padres cut their losses. Returning King to the starting role he had as a prospect, the Padres watched him make 30 starts with a 2.95 ERA (3.33 FIP) and pick up some downballot Cy Young votes. He was running back that performance through mid-May when a nerve issue in his throwing shoulder shut him down for two months, then he injured his left knee in his August return, and threw just one relief inning in the Padres’ wild-card series against the Cubs. King was a tough free agent to evaluate, and his situation became more complicated when the Padres tagged him with a qualifying offer. King refused it, adding cost to any team looking to add him as a free agent. 
 
 

Wednesday, December 17, 2025

Newsletter Excerpt, December 17, 2025 -- "Twin Cities Turnover"

 

This is a preview of the Joe Sheehan Baseball Newsletter, an e-mail newsletter about all things baseball, featuring analysis and opinion about the game on and off the field from the perspective of the informed outsider.

You can subscribe to the newsletter for one year for $79.95 using your PayPal account or major credit card. (Zelle users, please email me for details.)

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After we all stopped paying attention to the Twins, their starters were sixth in innings, 14th in FIP, and 11th in fWAR in September. For all the players they did trade in July, they kept this group intact, and despite near-daily trade rumors, it’s still intact. The Twins have a high floor and have to be considered a contender in the AL Central because of this group.

Pablo Lopez returned from a shoulder strain in June to make three starts in September, then was shut down again with a forearm strain that isn’t expected to affect his 2026. Zebby Matthews had some blow-up outings that wrecked his ERA, but finished the year with an 88/24 K/BB and a 3.79 FIP. He should be the #3 this year. Simeon Woods-Richardson started using a splitter more after a month lost to, if you can believe it, a parasite in his digestive tract. The pitch helped him strike out 36 of the last 104 batters he faced.

 
 

Monday, December 15, 2025

Newsletter Excerpt, December 15, 2025 -- "Isaac Collins and the Royals"

 

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First, Collins pairs a strong walk rate with weakly-hit batted balls, and that’s a fragile skill set. Collins ranked in the bottom 20% of MLB hitters in barrel rate and expected slugging, and in the bottom half in exit velocity and hard-hit rate. He hit .263 and slugged .411 on batted balls expected to produce .247/.349. Parallel to that, he walked 13% of the time. Of the 34 MLB hitters who walked at least 12% of the time (min. 300 PA), Collins was 25th in SLG and 29th in isolated power. Collins’s swing decisions, as measured by SEAGER, were among the worst in the game -- 255th among 268 hitters with 300 PA, and only a handful of players took more hittable pitches. I, tongue in cheek, comped him to Lance Blankenship, but the more I look into his profile, the more it seems all walks and little else.

My other concern is that Collins was 27 as a rookie, and an old 27. He’ll turn 29 on July 22, 2026. There’s just not much runway for him to get better, and he’s going to an organization with no track record of making hitters better.
 

Friday, December 12, 2025

Newsletter Excerpt, December 12, 2025 -- "Flushing Blues"

This is a preview of the Joe Sheehan Baseball Newsletter, an e-mail newsletter about all things baseball, featuring analysis and opinion about the game on and off the field from the perspective of the informed outsider.

You can subscribe to the newsletter for one year for $79.95 using your PayPal account or major credit card. (Zelle users, please email me for details.)

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It’s not that any of these data points has to be the winning domino, slammed down on the table. Alonso was a lifetime Met and the team’s most popular player. Alonso is a player of limited skills who is unlikely to hold his value over the life of a five-year deal. Stearns’s job is to balance those factors and make a decision. I think it’s fair for Mets fans to be disappointed in the decision without reducing, as I saw in many places, Stearns to a caricature, a robot who doesn’t understand Mets’ fans relationship with Alonso. Even at that, what would have been a reasonable counter to the Orioles’ offer? $32 million a year? $35 million a year? $40 million a year?

How about $65 million?

From where I sit, the single biggest factor in the decision to let Alonso walk isn’t the aging curve or his bad defense or even David Stearns hating Mets fans. It’s the product-investment tax. It’s the rules put in place to, more or less, stop the Mets from signing Pete Alonso.